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Abstract 
Rose (2004) reports that GATT/WTO membership produces no positive effects on 
international trade. This is a remarkable determination given the widespread belief in academic 
and policy circles that the WTO successfully promotes trade flows by reducing barriers to 
international trade. Empirical literature measuring the GATT/WTO trade effects has produced 
notably diverse results since Rose's (2004) paper. This report introduces the history of 
GATT/WTO and describes the GATT/WTO’s aim to promote trade using multilateral rounds of 
trade negotiations. It confirms that the efforts toward trade liberalization made by the 
GATT/WTO are partially achieved by tariff reductions and other trade obligations. In discussing 
the literature related to Rose’s surprising results, we argue that the gravity model employed by 
Rose (2004) is not theoretically sound since it omits multilateral resistance terms and fails to 
capture unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. However, we find that even an accurate specification 
gravity model that controls multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and 
individual regional trade agreement effect cannot fully account for Rose’s GATT/WTO trade 
effects findings. The present report suggests that a new approach, specifically the nonparametric 
method used by Chang and Lee (2011), may offer sound guidance for future research attempting 
to understand Rose’s mysterious findings. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)—probably the most popular multilateral organization—exist to further 
world trade liberalization. Currently, the WTO has 157 members and 26 observers, which 
represent a significant growth in terms of membership given the GATT/WTO had only 23 
members in 1947. Meanwhile, global trade flows have increased at a rate higher than the growth 
rate of merchandise output. According to World Trade Report 2012, the average export growth 
rate from 1991-2011 was 5.4% while the average output growth rate was 3.2% (WTO 2012, p. 
19-20).  
The facts above seem to be consistent with trade agreement theory that argues an 
effective trade agreement generates gains from trade liberalization by reducing trade barriers 
among contracting parties (Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz 2010, p.235; Bagwell and Staiger 
2002, p. 13). However, empirical literature measuring the trade effects of GATT/WTO 
membership has shown surprisingly ambiguous results. Rose (2004) employed a standard gravity 
model and a large panel dataset covering over 50 years and 175 countries to analyze whether 
GATT/WTO member countries experience significantly higher trade than that of outsiders. 
Unexpectedly, his work showed little evidence that membership in GATT/WTO has had a strong 
positive effect on international trade. Rose (2004, p.112) described his negative findings as an 
“interesting mystery.” His paper caused a long-term debate within the profession. With Rose’s 
findings in mind, the purpose of this report is to evaluate the GATT/WTO trade effects from a 
historical and empirical perspective, to explain the sources of the divergent conclusions of 
economists since Rose, and to provide an objective assessment of the literature.  
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The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the 
GATT/WTO efforts on trade liberalization in history and its universal principles in trade 
negotiation. The theoretical foundations of gravity model, including the cases with and without 
trade barriers, are introduced in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines Rose’s (2004) and other 
economists’ empirical work on GATT/WTO trade effects, and describes these economists’ 
attempts at understanding Rose’s GATT/WTO trade effects findings. Chapter 5 concludes with 
final comments and recommendations.  
 
Chapter 2 -  WTO Trade Effects in Historical Perspective  
One way to understand whether GATT/WTO promotes international trade is through 
what GATT/WTO has done in its history. Therefore, in this chapter, we briefly describe the 
history and design of GATT/WTO. Moreover, we attempt to clarify that the efforts made by the 
GATT/WTO on trade liberalization are partially achieved by tariff reductions and other trade 
obligations though multilateral trade negotiations under some universal principles with which 
GATT/WTO complied. 
 2.1 GATT/WTO Efforts on Trade Liberalization 
 2.2.1 The Design of GATT 
The origin of GATT dates back to trade-policy choices made by governments in the 
1920s and 1930s. The foundations of economic liberalism, badly shaken by World War I, were 
all but demolished by the Great Depression (Hudec 1975, p. 5). In 1930, the United States 
enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act to raise U.S import tariffs to its record levels, which led a 
large numbers of U.S. trading partners to raise their tariffs in retaliation. Ultimately, the post-
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Smoot-Hawley tariff rates for major powers were generally on the order of 50 percent (Bagwell 
and Staiger 2002, p. 43).  
As Hudec (1975, p. 4) claimed, “[t]he postwar design for international trade policy was 
animated by a single-minded concern to avoid repeating the disastrous errors of the 1920’s and 
1930’s.” Two important lessons were absorbed by the disastrous errors. One was the conclusion 
that the policy of trade restriction and discrimination had been proven wrong. The other was 
drawn about the institutional features of international cooperation (Hudec 1975, p. 5-6).  
Responding to these lessons, the major initiatives leading to the establishment of the 
GATT were taken by the United States during World War II, in cooperation with its allies, 
particularly the United Kingdom (Jackson 1997, p. 35). In 1945, the U.S. government invited a 
number of nations to negotiate to a multilateral agreement for the mutual reduction of tariffs 
(Jackson 1997, p. 36). Through a series of informal conferences, the trade experts canvassed 
most of the leading problems: quantitative restrictions, subsidies, export taxes, state trading, 
discrimination, and tariff reduction (Hudec 1975, p. 8). These trade issues confronting 
governments offered basic directions for GATT negotiations. 
Before the design of GATT, the United States had reached some bilateral trade 
agreements under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.  The success of these bilateral 
trade agreements have proven that reciprocal tariff reductions could promote mutual gains 
(Bagwell and Staiger 2002, p. 46). The United States thus attempted to organize a multilateral 
institution that would build on the fundamental elements of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
Act. Negotiations began concerning the formation of an International Trade Organization (ITO) 
in 1946 (Jackson 1997, p. 37). The ITO would stipulate the rules under which multilateral 
negotiations would progress, as well as the manner in which these rules would be enforced. 
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Tariffs were to be lowered in reciprocal and mutually advantageous agreements, and the reduced 
tariffs would then be extended to all member countries through the nondiscrimination principle. 
Nevertheless, the ITO was never ratified by the US Congress and some other countries. One 
reason might be, as suggested by Hudec (1975, p. 54), that “the ITO had focused on its 
provisions in areas other than trade policy.” 
In 1947, an interim agreement was reached. This agreement was known as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and it was drawn directly from ITO principles and 
obligations since it had been settled for some time that the General Agreement would be 
absorbed into the ITO when it came into force (Hudec 1975, p. 45). Compared to the ITO 
Charter, “GATT was narrower, more tentative, and made fewer of wrong concessions” (Hudec 
1975, p. 54). The narrow focus of the GATT served the process of trade liberalization, and the 
Agreement was originally framed as a “provisional trade agreement” in order to help some 
governments evade domestic ratification procedures (Hudec 1975, p. 46). 
The purpose of the GATT, as stated in its preamble, is to contribute to “[r]aising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and 
expanding the production and exchange of goods” by “[e]ntering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” Although 
“free trade” was never directly mentioned as an objective of GATT, measures that reduced tariff 
and non-tariff barriers indeed promoted trade liberalizing, and it was embraced in trade 
negotiation rounds sponsored by GATT. 
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 2.1.2 GATT/WTO Trade Negotiation Rounds 
The efforts of GATT to boost trade were primarily through a series of trade negotiation 
rounds. Since its creation in 1947, eight rounds of trade negotiations had taken place. The first 
five of these rounds were devoted almost exclusively to tariff negotiations. The sixth round, the 
Kennedy Round, had as one of its goals the negotiation of non-tariff measure obligations but 
succeeded only in a limited way to achieve this goal. The seventh round, the Tokyo Round, was 
devoted more to non-tariff measures than to tariffs (Jackson 1997, p. 74). 
In the history of GATT, the most resounding success has undoubtedly been the reduction 
of tariff levels among the contracting parties. Table 1 shows the scope and success of the tariff-
reducing activity of GATT. 
Table 1 Scope and success of the tariff-reducing activity of GATT 
Round Dates Number of 
countries 
Value of trade 
covered 
Average 
tariff cut 
Average tariffs 
afterward 
Geneva 1947 23 $10 billion 35% “not available” 
Annecy 1949 33 Unavailable 35% “not available” 
Torquay 1950 34 Unavailable 35% “not available” 
Geneva 1956 22 $2.5 billion 35% “not available” 
Dillon 1960-61 45 $4.9 billion 35% “not available” 
Kennedy 1962-67 48 $40 billion 35% 8.7% 
Tokyo 1973-79 99 $155 billion 34% 6.3% 
Uruguay 1986-94 120+ $3.7 trillion 38% 3.9% 
Source: Jackson 1997, p. 74 
Note: the tariff averages refer to tariffs on non-primary products of industrial 
countries 
 
According to Table 1, we know that after the Kennedy Round, the average tariff rates of 
industrial countries were just 8.7%, and the total value of trade covered after six rounds was 
more than 55 billion dollar (without accounting for two missed data). Moreover, the average 
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tariff cut in each negotiation round was 35%. The evidence shown above proved that the GATT 
succeeded with tariff reduction. 
Although the GATT might have its primary significance in the field of tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers to trade were not ignored. A closer glance at the last two rows of Table 1 shows that the 
number of countries in the Tokyo Round was twice than that of the Kennedy Round, while the 
value of trade covered increased almost fourfold. The achievement happened because of not only 
tariff reduction measures, but also non-tariff barriers negotiation in Tokyo Round. The Tokyo 
Multilateral trade negotiation resulted in nine special agreements and four “understandings” to 
deal with non-tariff barriers (Jackson 1997, p. 76). These agreements and “understandings” 
included technical barriers to trade, government procurement, subsidies, and antidumping duties 
as well as some exception causes. Even though some important problems remained, such as the 
liberalization process of agriculture and textiles, new trade-policy issues including services, 
trade-related investment, and intellectual property and other trade issues, the overall impact of 
these results was to substantially broaden the GATT system’s scope of coverage (Jackson 1997, 
p. 76). 
These problems mentioned above were addressed in the GATT Uruguay Round, an 
extraordinarily ambitious round that lasted from 1986 to 1994. It was the largest trade 
negotiation in history and its negotiating agenda covered every outstanding trade policy issue 
(WTO 2011, p. 18). In this round, governments achieved some success in the liberalization of 
agricultural and textile goods, extended the trade system into several new areas, including 
services, trade-related investment, and intellectual property, and eventually developed a full-
fledged international trade organization-World Trade Organization (WTO), which brought the 
failed attempt in 1948 to create an International Trade Organization (ITO) to reality. 
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The agreement establishing the WTO is the umbrella that embraces all parts of the 
detailed texts (Jackson 1997, p. 47). The WTO inherited the rules and agreements made in the 
preceding GATT negotiations. Furthermore, the WTO has an explicit organization charter that 
“defines various committees, bodies, and councils, as well as the duties of and relationships 
between these groups” (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, p. 47). Although the WTO Charter is a mere 
ten pages long, it has four very important annexes, which contain all the other negotiated texts of 
the Uruguay Round (WTO 1995, p. 9). Finally, an important innovation associated with the 
WTO is a unified dispute-settlement system. The system, which is essential to the functioning of 
the multilateral trading system, offers an external enforcement mechanism to punish 
GATT/WTO violations (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, p. 52). 
No matter how many trade issues were involved in the Uruguay Round, it was impossible 
to settle the issues once and for all. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was 
developed as a sort of framework agreement for the entire landscape of services trade, which 
leaves a great deal unresolved, in some cases calling for specific ongoing negotiations (Jackson 
1997, p. 307). The agricultural agreement has lowered the amount of export subsidies, but 
eliminating it altogether has proven impossible (Jackson 1997, p. 316). The agreement on trade-
related investment includes an Annex with an “illustrative list” of items are inconsistent with the 
obligation of national treatment (Jackson 1997, p. 317). These problems and other issues without 
mention required additional negotiation rounds, which began in 2001 in the Doha Round. 
One might wonder whether the GATT was a success. In retrospect, its success in 
promoting and securing world trade liberalization is indisputable. Continual reductions in tariffs 
to such a low level have helped spur world trade growth. The rush of new members during the 
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Uruguay Round demonstrated that the multilateral trading system was acknowledged as an 
anchor for development and an instrument of economic and trade reform (WTO 2011, p. 17). 
However, some gaps have undermined GATT’s credibility and effectiveness. A series of 
economic recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s propelled governments to contrive other forms 
of protection for sectors facing increased foreign competition (WTO 2011, p. 17). The trade-rule 
system of the GATT did not have a very effective enforcement mechanism to punish violations 
(Dam 1970, p. 80). Moreover, in order to raise the standards of living and to continue the 
progressive development of the economies of developing countries, many provisions including 
Article XVIII and the Articles in part IV in GATT allowed differential treatment for developing 
countries. These privileges included, among others, permission for 1) using that quantitative 
restriction to combat payment imbalances and protecting infant industries and 2) less-developed 
countries no longer to be required to offer “reciprocity” in tariff negotiations with developed 
countries (Jackson 1997, p. 319-22; Dam 1970, p. 225-55). Some new trade issues that have not 
been discussed were never covered in the provisions of the GATT to solve trade distortions.  
One may expect that under the WTO, most of the institutional and legal problems of the 
GATT would have been corrected or at least improved; yet, a key question is whether the new 
charter for the WTO will allow the organization to efficiently adapt. Every treaty will require 
attention to various interpretive difficulties, due to unforeseen ambiguities or compromises in the 
drafting process. Furthermore, some important new subjects, such as environmental protection, 
competition policy, and trade-related investment might not necessarily be acceptable to all 
members of the very large WTO. Additionally, responding to a strong regionalism movement in 
the last two decades, many regional organizations have developed, which might cause challenges 
to the multilateral WTO (Jackson 1997, p. 343-45). 
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 2.2 Trade Negotiation Principles in GATT/WTO 
Given that before the GATT/WTO acted, to some extent, as an effective agreement, one 
might wonder what measures members had to take to guarantee that every member would gain 
from trade though the agreement. To answer this question, we next probe into the fundamental 
principles—reciprocity, nondiscrimination, and enforcement—by which all GATT/WTO abided. 
These principles are the foundation of the multilateral trading system. 
 2.2.1 Reciprocity 
The term “reciprocity” refers broadly to “the ideal of mutual changes in trade policy 
which bring about changes in the volume of each country’s imports that is of equal value to 
changes in the volume of its exports” (Bagwell and Staiger 2002, p. 57). A more basic 
understanding is that mutual changes in trade policy that conform to the principle of reciprocity 
leave the world price unchanged. Ethier (2004, p. 9) pointed out that when governments 
negotiate for trade agreement, they should realize all bargaining, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, will involve reciprocal liberalization. It offered an existent rationale for the 
GATT/WTO to weigh heavily the importance of the reciprocity principle. 
Two applications of reciprocity are associated within GATT/WTO practice. The first 
reflects that governments seek a “balance of concessions and obligations” through a negotiated 
agreement (Jackson 1997 p. 113). Dam (1970, p. 59) explained that under the language of Article 
XXVIII bis, negotiations are voluntary and are to be conducted on a “reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous basis,” the manner that makes trade negotiation among governments more likely to 
occur. The second application concerns the manner in which trade agreements may be 
renegotiated (Bagwell and Straiger 2002, p. 65). They further explained that: 
Under GATT Article XXVIII, a country might propose to modify or withdraw a concession agreed 
upon in a previous round of negotiation. In the case, if the country and its trading partner are unable to 
reach agreement regarding a renegotiated tariff structure, then the country is free to carry out the 
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proposed changes anyway. The notion of reciprocity is then used to moderate the response of the 
country’s trading partner, who is permitted to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions of its 
own. 
 
In sum, the principle of reciprocity acts as an implicit but significant precondition for 
countries to seek negotiations or renegotiations to reach the “balance of concessions and 
obligations” goal. 
 2.2.2 Nondiscrimination 
Nondiscrimination has two major components: the most-favored-nation (MFN) rule, and 
the national treatment principle. The MFN rule has been a central pillar of bilateral and 
multilateral trade policy for centuries (Irwin 1993). The MFN rule holds that “it is an obligation 
to treat activities of a particular foreign country or its citizens at least as favorably as it treats the 
activities of any other country” (Jackson 1997, p. 160). For example, under MFN, if a trading 
partner supplying a specific product is granted a 5 percent tariff, this rate must be applied 
immediately and unconditionally to imports of this good originating from all WTO members.  
Several economic policy arguments in favor of MFN are evident. First, nondiscrimination 
can have the salutary effect of minimizing distortions of the market principles that motivate 
many arguments in favor of liberal trade. Second, MFN often causes a generalization of 
liberalizing trade policies, so that overall more trade liberalization occurs. Third, MFN’s 
provision of general rules applicable to all participating nations minimizes the costs of rules 
formation, such as the difficulty of negotiating a multitude of bilateral agreements. Finally, MFN 
helps minimize transaction costs, because customs officials at the border may not need to 
ascertain the “origin of goods” to carry out their tasks with respect to goods controlled by MFN 
(Jackson 1997, p. 159). 
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The national treatment principle, expressed primarily in Article III of GATT, requires the 
treatment of imported goods, once they have cleared customs and border procedures, to be no 
worse than that of domestically produced goods (Jackson 1997, p. 213). This rule obviously 
prevents domestic tax and regulatory policies from being used as protectionist measures that 
would defeat the purpose of tariff bindings. The national treatment rule is very wide-ranging. For 
example, the obligation applies whether or not a specific tariff commitment was made, and it 
covers taxes and other policies, which must be applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion to 
domestic and foreign products alike.  
Despite the policies and legal obligations that support the nondiscrimination principle, 
substantial departures in international trade practice are evident. Kostecki (1987, p. 429) 
estimated that 25 percent of all world trade moves under some form of discriminatory regime 
that departs from MFN principles. Many loopholes and exceptions are exploited to create 
discriminations, among them classifications of tariff items, existence of general and security 
exceptions, escape clause, safeguards, and government purchases (Jackson 1997, p. 163-64, 214-
28). One of the most prominent and difficult problems is found in Article XXIV, which provides 
exceptions for customs unions (CUs), free trade areas (FTAs), and interim agreements leading to 
either. This article has opened significant loophole for a wide variety of preferential agreements 
(Jackson 1997, p. 165). Some of these violations of nondiscrimination principle, to some degree, 
cripple the effectiveness of GATT/WTO’s liberalization of trade.  
 2.2.3 Enforcement 
While it is often observed that the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination are the 
pillars of GATT/WTO, the enforcement mechanisms compose the heart of the GATT/WTO 
system. Trade liberalization agreements have little value if they cannot be enforced. The 
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enforcement mechanisms can be divided into three basic elements: substantive obligations, 
permissible exceptions to those obligations, and dispute settlement procedures (Bagwell and 
Straiger 2002, p. 48). 
As Jackson (1997, p. 51) explains, the substantive obligations contained in GATT can be 
generalized to three groups. One group is tariff commitments, including Article II and XXVIII 
bis, which form the “bindings” that the actual tariff is not to exceed the bound duty rate. The 
second group is MFN treatment (Article I) discussed above. The final is a series of other 
commitments that together represent a “code of conduct” regarding government behavior in the 
international-trade arena. This includes national treatment (Article III), anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties (Article VI), customs valuation and procedures (Articles VII, VIII, and X), 
marks of origin (Article IX), quantitative restrictions (Article XI), subsides (Article XVI), and 
state-trading monopolies (Article XVII). The “code of conduct” and other obligations build the 
framework of GATT trade policy commitments. 
The exceptions in GATT seem to be a controversial issue. On the one hand, they weaken 
the validity of the enforcement systems, but on the other hand, the inclusion of exceptions are 
necessary given the economic nature of tariff concessions and the domestic political sensitivity 
inherently involved in trade issues. A system that prohibiting exceptions would tend to 
discourage the making of concessions in the first place (Dam 1970, p. 80). The permissible 
exceptions thus act as “safeguards” that are designed to encourage tariff commitments and 
confidence in the GATT/WTO system (Bagwell and Straiger 2002, p. 50). 
One of the great achievements of the Uruguay Round is the development of a unified 
dispute settlement system for all parts of the GATT/WTO’s system, including the new subjects 
of services and intellectual property. The dispute settlement procedures provide an external 
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enforcement mechanism to punish GATT/WTO violations. The central components of 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement system evolved through GATT/WTO practice with reference to 
the provisions contained in Articles XXII and XXIII. Article XXII calls for bilateral 
consultations when disputes arise, while Article XXIII (“Nullification or Impairment”) is the real 
centerpiece of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process, as it defines the circumstances under 
which the actions by one country serve to “nullify or impair” the benefits expected under the 
agreement by another country (Jackson 1997, p. 115).  
The GATT/WTO procedure for settling disputes involves three stages: consultation 
between or among the members in the dispute; investigation, ruling and recommendation by a 
GATT/WTO panel; and as a last resort, authorization for one or more countries to suspend 
GATT/WTO obligations against another. In practice, the greatest emphasis has been placed on 
consultation and negotiation rather than on retaliation. The threat of authorized retaliation is 
often the catalyst of resolution in the consultation and negotiation stage (Bagwell and Straiger 
2002, p. 54). 
In summary, the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination incentivise participation 
in multilateral trade negotiations under GATT/WTO and motivate the creation of mutually 
effective and financially beneficial trade agreements. The principle of enforcement guarantees 
that the achievements of the GATT/WTO are not undermined by GATT/WTO violations. All are 
of particular importance in maintaining the effectiveness of GATT/WTO. 
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Chapter 3 - The Gravity Model in Trade Effect Analysis 
As the previous section elucidates, the WTO may have served as an effective multilateral 
trade agreement by reducing, in particular, formal tariff barriers through different multilateral 
rounds of trade negotiations. However, Rose (2004) was not able to identify positive 
GATT/WTO trade effects under his empirical strategy. Since Rose's (2004) methodology is 
based on the popular gravity model of international trade, we describe the theoretical results 
related to the gravity model in this section. We leave the discussion of using the gravity model to 
ascertain the WTO trade effects for the next Section. 
 3.1 Literature Review 
The gravity model has a long track record of success in that it provides economically and 
statistically significant effects while explaining most variation in trade (Frankel 1997). It was 
first developed by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) with only intuitive justification. In its 
basic form, the amount of trade between two countries is assumed to be increasing in size, as 
measured by their national incomes, and decreasing in the cost of transport between them, as 
measured by the distance between the two countries. Linnemann (1966) augmented the basic 
form of the gravity model and included more explanatory variables. However, despite the gravity 
model’s empirical success in explaining trade flows, the model’s predictive potential has been 
inhibited by the absence of strong theoretical foundations (Bergstrand 1985). Consequently the 
gravity model was neglected from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. 
New theoretical foundations for the gravity model have been proposed with the advent of 
trade theories based on 1) increasing returns to scale, imperfectly competitive markets, firm-level 
product differentiation, and 2) within a perfect competition situation, along with product 
differentiation at the national level (Carrere 2006). Anderson (1979) was the first to derive the 
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gravity equation from models that assumed product differentiation using constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) preferences, also called the Armington assumption, which assumes that 
products were differentiated by country of origin. Anderson’s primary concern was to examine 
the econometric properties of the resulting equations rather than to extract easily interpretable 
theoretical implications. Bergstrand (1985), like Anderson, used CES preferences over 
differentiated goods to derive a reduced form of gravity equation for bilateral trade involving 
price indexes. Moreover, Bergstrand (1989) assumed monopolistic competition in a two-sector 
economy in which monopolistically competitive sectors had different relative factor intensities. 
This implies that his model derives a general version of the gravity model that “‘fit in’ with the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of inter-industry trade and the Helpman-Krugman-Markusen models of 
intra-industry trade”. Deardorff (1998) has derived the gravity equation from classical theories of 
the Hecksher-Ohlin framework under perfect competition assumption. These contributions built 
the theoretical foundations of the gravity model for empirical analysis.   
 3.2 The Gravity Model without Trade Barriers 
In international trade, bilateral gross aggregate trade flows are commonly explained by 
using the following specification: 
31 2 4
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (3.1)ij i j ij ij ijX Y Y D A
     
Where ijX is the value of the trade flow from country i to country j , iY ( jY ) is the value 
of nominal GDP in i ( j ), ijD is the distance from the economic center of i to that of j , ijA is any 
other factor(s) either aiding or resisting to trade between i and j , and ij  is a log-normally 
distributed error term with (ln ) 0ijE   . This specification was used in Tinbergen (1962), 
Poyhonen (1963) and other researchers during 1960s and 1970s (Bergstrand 1985). A simpler 
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version of the gravity equation can be derived from under the assumption of free trade, so that all 
countries have identical prices. This deriving process based on Feenstra (2004) is explained next. 
First, we assume that countries are specialized in different varieties of a final product. We 
also assume the consumer preference is identical and homothetic across countries and that trade 
is free (no tariffs or transport costs). Then it follows that a good produced in any country is sent 
to all other countries in proportion to the purchasing country’s income. Now we consider a multi-
country framework where , 1,...,i j I denotes countries, and 1,...,k N denotes products (any 
variety of a good counts as a distinct product). Let kiy denote country i ’s production of good k . 
Since prices are the same across all countries, we normalize them to unity, so kiy actually 
measures the value of production. The total income in each country is measured by
1
N
i ki
k
y y

 , 
and world income is
1
I
W
i
i
y y

 . 
Let js  denote country j ’s share of world expenditure. Assuming that trade is balanced in 
each country, the js  also denotes country j ’s share of world GDP, so that /
W
j js y y . Then 
under the assumptions that all countries are producing different products and the consumer 
preference is identical and homothetic, the exports from country i to county j of product k are 
given by: 
(3.2)kij j kix s y  
Summing over all products k, we obtain: 
1 1
(3.3)
N I
j i W
ij kij j ki j i j i jiW
k i
y y
x x s y s y s s y x
y 
        
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Summing the first and last of these terms, we therefore find that bilateral trade between 
two countries equals, 
2
(3.4)ij ji i jWx x y yy
 
   
 
 
This gives our simplest derivation of the gravity equation, where the bilateral exports 
from country i to country j are proportional to the product of their GDP’s. Next, we will loosen 
the assumption of free trade and allow for differing prices due to trade barriers between 
countries. Doing so proves important when we apply it for empirical analysis in Section 4. 
 3.3 The Gravity Model with Trade Barriers 
When there are trade barriers, such as transport costs or tariffs, it is no longer the case 
that prices are equalized across countries, and then the gravity equation (3.4) has to be 
augmented by certain variables as we discuss below. Thus, the estimation based on the gravity 
equation (3.4) may suffer from severe omitted variables bias. Now we introduce a new version of 
the gravity model that was built by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), who used it to solve the 
famous border puzzle of McCallum (1995), which found trade volume between Canadian 
provinces to be substantially larger (a factor of 22 [2,200%]) than across the border with the 
United States after controlling for the usual determinants of bilateral trade, such as size and 
distance in the gravity model. 
Base on the assumptions of Bergstrand (1989) and Deardoff (1998) by the CES 
preference and Heckscher-Ohlin structure under perfect competition situation along with product 
differentiation at the national level, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, p. 174) first assume that 
all goods are differentiated by place of origin and each country is specialized in the production of 
only one good. The supply of each good is fixed.  
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They also assume identical, homothetic preferences, approximated by a CES utility 
function. If ijc is consumption by country j ’s consumers of goods from country i , and 
country j ’s consumers choosing to maximize the utility for country j : 
/(1 )
(1 )/ ( 1)/ (3.5)
I
j i ij
i
U c
 
   

    
 
  
subject to the budget constraint 
. (3.6)
I
ij ij j
i
p c y  
Here  is the elasticity of substitution between all goods, i  is a positive distribution 
parameter, jy  is the total nominal income of country j residents, and ijp  is the price of 
country i ’s goods for country j ’s consumers. Prices differ between countries due to trade costs 
that are not directly observable. Let denote ip  the exporter’s supply price, net of trade costs, and 
let ijt  be the trade cost factor between i and j , then ij i ijp p t . This formulation is called “iceberg” 
trade costs and was introduced by Samuelson (1952). 
We assume that trade costs are borne by the exporter, and for each good shipped from 
i to j , the exporter incurs export costs equal to 1ijt  of country i goods. The exporter passes these 
trade costs on to the importer. The nominal value of exports from i to j is ij ij ijx p c , the sum of 
the value of production at the origin is i ijp c , and the exporter passes the sum of the trade 
cost ( 1)ij i ijt p c on to the importer. Total income of country i is therefore i ijjy x . 
The nominal demand for country i ’s goods by country j ’s consumers satisfying 
maximization of (3.5) subject to (3.6) is 
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1
, (3.7)
i i ij
ij j
j
p t
x y
P



 
   
 
 
where jP is the consumer price index of j , given by 
1/(1 )
1( ) (3.8)
I
j i i ij
i
P p t



   
 
  
The general equilibrium structure of the model imposes market clearance, which implies: 
 
1 1( / ) , (3.9)
I I
i ij i i ij j j
j j
y x p t P y
 
     
Define world nominal income by W
jj
y y and income shares by / Wj js y y . And we 
solve for the scaled prices  i ip from the market clearing conditions (3.8) and substitute them 
in the demand equation (3.6). We get: 
1
(3.10)
i j ij
ij W
i j
y y t
x
y P

 
    
 
where 
1/(1 )
1
1
( / ) (3.11)
I
i ij j j
j
t P s





 
   
 
  
Substituting the equilibrium scaled prices (3.11) into (3.8), we obtain 
1/(1 )
1
1
( / ) (3.12)
I
j ij i i
i
P t s





 
  
 
  
We assume that the trade barriers are symmetric, that is ij jit t . Under symmetry, a 
solution to (3.11)-(3.12) is i iP  . Then we get: 
1
(3.13)
i j ij
ij W
i j
y y t
x
y PP

 
   
 
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where 
1 1 1 (3.14)
I
j i i ij
i
P P s t      
The equation (3.13) is remarkably simple, whereby bilateral trade between countries 
depends on their GDP’s and also their implicit price indexes. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
call iP and jP  “indexes of multilateral resistance” because they depend on all bilateral 
resistances ijt in (3.14). These indexes are unobserved, but Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
argue that we can solve for them by using equation (3.14) in combination with a formula for the 
trade costs ijt . 
A drawback to the estimation of the gravity equation (3.13) is that it requires custom 
programming to perform the constrained minimization and obtain standard errors (Feenstra 2004, 
Ch. 5). An approach to estimating the gravity equation, while using ordinary least squares, is to 
use fixed effect to account for the unobserved price indexes. Fixed effects have been used in the 
gravity equation by a number of authors, including Harrigan (1996), Rose and van Wincoop 
(2003), and Redding and Venables (2004). Feenstra (2004, Ch. 5) suggests that fixed effects 
might be the preferred empirical method because it can produce consistent estimates of the 
average border effect across countries, and it is easy to implement. 
We have introduced two versions of gravity equation: one version contains the 
multilateral resistance terms, and the other does not. In the next chapter, we will show that 
significantly different conclusions might be drawn by the different versions of gravity model to 
analyze the GATT/WTO trade effects. 
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Chapter 4 - Empirical Analysis for WTO Trade Effects 
In this chapter, we will review Rose’s (2004) empirical strategy and conclusions in 
analyzing the GATT/WTO trade effects. Moreover, we introduce other economists’ solutions to 
Rose’s problematic GATT/WTO trade effects findings by arguing that the specification gravity 
model employed by Rose (2004) might omit important variables, particularly multilateral 
resistance terms. 
 4.1 GATT/WTO Trade Effects without Multilateral Resistance 
In order to quantify the effects of the multilateral trade agreements (GATT/WTO) on 
international trade, Rose’s (2004) empirical work relied on the standard gravity model of 
bilateral trade. Furthermore, Rose (2005) used the same empirical strategy and dataset to 
estimate whether international organizations such as GATT/WTO, IMF, and OEEC/OECD 
encourage international trade. I review the results of Rose (2005) to offer a robustness check. 
Considering that one of the most important procedures for empirical study is to obtain suitable 
data, we first introduce the dataset that Rose (2004; 2005) used. 
4.1.1 Data 
One noteworthy contribution of Rose (2004) was a large panel dataset that enabled 
economists to examine the GATT/WTO trade effects empirically. In Rose’s dataset, the trade 
data came from the “Direction of Trade” (DoT) CD-ROM dataset developed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). It covered bilateral merchandise trade between 178 IMF trading entities 
between 1948 and 1999; a list of the countries could be found in Rose (2004, Table A1). 
Bilateral trade on FOB exports and CIF imports was recorded in American dollars; Rose (2004) 
deflated trade by the American CPI for all urban consumers (1982-1984=100; taken from 
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www.freelunch.com). An average value of bilateral trade between a pair of countries was created 
by averaging all of the (four possible) measures of trade volume (exports from i   to j , imports 
into j from i , and so forth). Population and real GDP data (in constant American dollars) were 
obtained from the Penn World Table, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Rose (2004) utilized the CIA’s World Factbook to get a 
number of country-specific variables, including: latitude and longitude, land area, landlocked and 
island status, physically contiguous neighbors, language, colonizers, and dates of independence. 
He also used it to create great-circle distance and the other controls. 
Rose (2004) added information on whether the pair of countries was involved in a 
currency union, using Glick-Rose (2002). He obtained data from the World Trade Organization 
to create an indicator of regional trade agreements, and included: ASEAN, EEC/EC/EU, US-
Israel FTA, NAFTA, CARICOM, PATCRA, ANZCERTA, CACM, SPARTECA, and Mercosur. 
Finally, Rose (2004) added the key variables of GATT/WTO membership. The WTO 
website provides dates for accession of its members to the GATT/WTO (Note that these 
members are de jure GATT/WTO membership defined by Tomz, et al. [2007, henceforth TGR]). 
The UN published Operation and Effects of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) at 
intervals; these booklets contained information on which industrial countries extended trade 
concessions to which developing country beneficiaries under the GSP. Rose (2004) obtained this 
pamphlet for 1974, 1979, and 1984 and used this information to construct bilateral time-varying 
GSP relationships. The dataset for Rose (2004) can now be obtained from Rose’s website 
(http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/). 
 4.1.2 Specification Gravity Model without Trade Barriers for Rose (2004) 
The exact specification of gravity model used by Rose (2004) is as follows: 
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where i  and j  denote trading partners, t  denotes time, and the variables are defined as: 
 ijtX denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i  and j  at time t , 
 ( )i jY Y is real GDP of country ( )i j , 
 ( )i jPop Pop is population of country ( )i j , 
 ijD is the distance between i  and j , 
 ijLang is a binary “dummy” variable which is unity if i  and j  have a common language and 
zero otherwise, 
 ijCont is a binary variable which is unity if i  and j  share a land border, 
 ijLandl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2), 
 ijIsland is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
 ijArea is the area of the country (in square kilometers), 
 ijComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i  and j  were ever colonies after 1945 with 
the same colonizer, 
 ijtCurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i  is a colony of j  at time t  or vice versa, 
 ijColony is a binary variable which is unity if i  ever colonized j  or vice versa, 
 ijComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i  and j  remained part of the same nation 
during the sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe), 
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 ijtCU is a binary variable which is unity if i  and j  use the same currency at time t , 
 ijtGSP is a binary variable which is unity if i was a GSP beneficiary of j or vice versa at t , 
 ijtFTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j both belong to the same regional trade 
agreement at time t , 
  tT is a comprehensive set of time “fixed effects”, 
  and are vectors of nuisance coefficients, 
 ijtBothin is a binary variable which is unity if both i and j are GATT/WTO members at t , 
 ijtOnein is a binary variable which is unity if either i or j is a GATT/WTO member at t , 
 ijt represents the omitted other influences on bilateral trade, assumed to be well-behaved. 
Rose (2004) estimated the gravity model using ordinary least squares, computing 
standard errors that were robust to clustering by country-pairs. He also included a comprehensive 
set of year-specific “fixed” effects to account for factors such as the value of the dollar, the 
global business cycle, the extent of globalization, oil shocks, and so forth. Since the dataset was a 
(country-pair time) panel, he used “random effects” (GLS) and “fixed effects” estimators as 
robustness checks. 
Rose’s (2004) empirical strategy was to control for as many “natural” causes of trade as 
possible and then search for effects of multilateral agreements in the residual. Once other factors 
had been taken into account, he compared trade patterns for countries in the GATT/WTO with 
those outside the system. He searched for this effect using variation across countries (since not 
all countries are in the system) and time (since membership of the GATT/WTO has grown). If 
the GATT/WTO has a large effect on trade, one can expect that members have significantly 
higher trade than outsiders. That is, the parameters of interest to us are 1 and 2 .  If trade is 
25 
 
created when both countries are in the GATT/WTO, 1 should be positive; if trade is diverted 
from non-members, then 2 may be negative because under nondiscrimination principle, 
members of GATT/WTO are under no obligation to extend MFN and national treatment to 
nonmembers.  
 4.1.3 Results of Rose (2004; 2005) and Comments by TGR (2007) 
The empirical results of GATT/WTO trade effects based on Rose (2004; 2005) can be 
found in Table 2. Since we are interested in just the GATT/WTO trade effects, we do not report 
other regressors except the GSP and regional trade agreement variable that Rose and other 
economists were interested in. However, full results are available from Rose (2004; 2005). 
Column 1 of Table 2 contains the benchmark regression results of Rose (2004). Both 
dummy variables for one or both of the countries being GATT/WTO members have small 
negative coefficients and neither is statistically different from zero at conventional significance 
levels. Since no reasonable person believes that membership in the GATT or WTO actually 
reduces trade, Rose (2004) interpreted the negative coefficients as an interesting mystery. Rose 
(2004) also added country-specific fixed effects to the benchmark equation, and these results are 
presented in column 2 of Table 2. However, these results show a small positive GATT/WTO 
trade effects. The coefficient of both in GATT/WTO 1( )  indicates that a pair of countries both 
in the GATT/WTO traded only 16% 0.15( 1)e  more than a pair of countries outside the 
GATT/WTO. This is rather small compared to other effects such as GSP and regional FTA. 
In order to show the results were not based on a peculiar or idiosyncratic methodology, 
Rose (2004, Table 2-7) demonstrated a substantial sensitive analysis. Eventually, his paper 
reported 82 sets of estimates of the parameters of interest, including 79 estimates of 1 , the effect 
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of GATT/WTO membership by both countries on trade. The mean estimate across these 
1 estimates was 0.05; the median was 0.01; 39 of the estimates were negative, while only four 
were greater than 0.69 (implying that GATT/WTO membership doubled trade). Fifty-seven (or 
71%) of the associated t -statistics were insignificant at conventional confidence levels (Rose 
2004, p. 111). So Rose (2004) concluded that membership in the GATT/WTO had no strong 
positive effect on international trade. 
Table 2 GATT/WTO trade effects based on Rose (2004; 2005) and TGR (2007) 
 Dependent variable: log average value of real bilateral trade 
Regression from Rose (2004) Rose (2005) TGR (2007) 
Estimation 
method 
Time 
fixed 
effects 
Country
-specific 
fixed 
effects 
Time 
fixed 
effects 
Country
-pair 
fixed 
effects 
Time 
fixed 
effects 
Country
-pair 
fixed 
effects 
 
 
 
Both 
in 
GATT/
WTO 
Both 
de jure 
member 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.15 
(0.05) 
-0.12 
(0.05) 
0.27 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.07) 
0.48 
(0.06) 
de jure 
and de 
facto 
member  
    0.80 
(0.14) 
0.88 
(0.09) 
Both de 
facto 
Member  
    0.41 
(0.07) 
0.56 
(0.06) 
Only 
one in 
GATT/
WTO 
de jure 
member 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.05) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.23 
(0.06) 
de facto 
member  
    0.33 
(0.09) 
0.34 
(0.07) 
GSP 0.86 
(0.03) 
0.70 
(0.03) 
0.66 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.01) 
0.85 
(0.03) 
0.18 
(0.03) 
Regional FTA 1.20 
(0.11) 
0.94 
(0.13) 
1.17 
(0.11) 
0.78 
(0.04) 
1.19 
(0.11) 
0.76 
(0.07) 
Obs. 234597 234597 234597 234597 234597 234597 
 0.65 0.70 0.65 0.53 0.649 0.853 
Standard error of 
regression 
1.98 1.82   1.976 1.313 
Source from: Rose (2004) Table 1; Rose (2005) Table 1; TGR (2007) Table 2, (3) and (5). 
Notes: other regressors in equation (4.1) do not report. Robust standard errors (clustered by 
country-pairs) are in parentheses. 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 illustrate the results of Rose (2005). He used the same 
specification gravity model and dataset as Rose (2004) did. The difference was that he added two 
other dummy variables of IMF and OEEC/OECD membership to evaluate whether these 
international organizations encourage international trade. In his benchmark regression (column 
3), he even obtained larger significantly negative coefficients. But when he used country-pair 
fixed effects to estimate his model, both coefficients became positive and statistically significant. 
Since the country-pair fixed effects take into account trade resistance and other unobservable 
features of the relationship between each pair of countries, they are used to control unobserved 
bilateral heterogeneity. Consequently, one may expect that the Rose (2004) specification gravity 
model might omit important variables and his results might be confronted with potential omitted 
variable bias. Subranmanian and Wei (2007, henceforth SW) suggested that the absence of 
multilateral resistance controls in Rose (2004; 2005) biased his GATT/WTO results downward. 
We will introduce SW (2007) specification gravity model later on. 
Regarding Rose’s (2004) GATT/WTO trade effects mystery, TGR (2007) argued that 
Rose had overlooked a large proportion of countries to which the GATT applied and mistakenly 
classified them as non-participants, when in fact these countries had rights and obligations under 
the GATT. This caused a downward bias in Rose’s estimates of the GATT/WTO trade effect, 
because his gravity regressions compared the trade levels of de jure members to the trade levels 
of a group that included many participants (TGR 2007, p. 2005). Moreover, TGR (2007) 
documented that the GATT gave rights and obligations not only to de jure members but also to 
three categories of nonmember participants: colonies, de facto members, and provisional 
members. 
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In order to verify their standpoint, TGR (2007) updated Rose’s dataset to include both de 
jure and de facto GATT/WTO membership and employed Rose’s methodology in their empirical 
work. The last two columns of Table 2 show the results of TGR (2007). The estimated models of 
TGR (2007) added indicators for whether the countries in each country-pair were nonmember 
participants. After they did this, they found significantly higher trade when both countries had 
GATT rights and obligations, either as formal members or as nonmember participants, compared 
with country-pairs in which neither country belonged to the GATT/WTO. According to the last 
column of Table 2, trade between two formal members was about 62 percent higher than trade 
between pairs of non-participants. When one country was a formal member and the other was a 
nonmember participant, trade was estimated to increase by about 141 percent, compared to the 
outsiders. Trade between two nonmember participants was estimated to be 75 percent higher 
than trade between countries without GATT rights and obligations. 
Even though TGR (2007) provided a solution to solve the GATT/WTO trade effects 
mystery by accounting for de facto GATT/WTO membership, they did not solve the mystery 
completely. When we look back on Rose’s (2004) specification gravity model, we can observe 
that the model omits the multilateral resistance terms. Omitting these terms means that both Rose 
(2004; 2005) and TGR (2007) evaluated the GATT/WTO trade effects without considering the 
existence of trade barriers between countries. Thus, the results of Rose (2004; 2005) and TGR 
(2007) might have omitted variable bias. Next, we will introduce the specification gravity model 
of SW (2007). Their gravity model attempted to solve Rose’s GATT/WTO trade effects mystery 
by including multilateral resistance terms. 
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 4.2 GATT/WTO Trade Effects with Multilateral Resistance 
 4.2.1 The Specification Gravity Model Based on SW (2007) 
SW (2007) preferred their benchmark specification was of the following form: 
1 2
3 4
Im
_ _ (4.2)
ijt ij mt mt xt xt ijt ijtm x
ijt ijt ijt
Log port Z M X FTA GSP
WTO DVED WTO DING
    
  
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 
 
 
ijtLogimport is log of bilateral import of importer i  from exporter j  in year t , 
 
ijZ  is a list of variables, including greater circle distance between i  and j , dummies for 
common language, colonial links, shared borders, and common currencies, the list includes 
all the covariates in Rose (2004), 
 mtM ’s are a list of time-varying importer dummies (that take the value of one if m i , and 
zero otherwise) to proxy for “multilateral resistance” of importer, 
 xtX ’s are a list of time-varying exporter dummies (that take the value of one if x j , and 
zero otherwise) to proxy for “multilateral resistance” of exporter, 
 ijtFTA is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if i and j  belong to a common regional 
trade agreement in year t , 
 ijtGSP is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the importing industrial country 
grants preferences under the GSP to exporting country j  in year t  and where i and j are not 
members of a common regional trade agreement in year t , 
 _ ijtWTO DVED is a dummy variable for importer i  that is a developed country GATT/WTO 
member and where i  and j  are not in a common regional trade agreement and where i  does 
not grant GSP preferences to j  in year t , 
 _ ijtWTO DING is a dummy variable for importer i  that is a developing country GATT/WTO 
30 
 
member and where i  and j  are not in a common regional trade agreement and where i  does 
not grant GSP preferences to j  in year t , 
 ijt is a normally distributed random error term that has a zero mean and a constant variance. 
There were several important differences between SW (2007) specification and that in 
Rose (2004) that should be emphasized. First, SW focused on imports by country i from 
country j as the regressand, whereas Rose focused on the average of i 's imports from j and i 's 
exports to j . Second, SW stressed that trade between any two countries would depend on the 
multilateral resistance of both importers and exporters, and they used time-varying importer and 
exporter fixed effects ( mtM and xtX ) to capture the multilateral resistance. Third, SW’s definition 
of the GSP and GATT/WTO dummies was different from that in Rose (2004). They relied on the 
fact that FTAs, the GSP, and the GATT/WTO involved different degrees of liberalization, and 
hence defined them mutually exclusive in order to be able to isolate the impact of each other. 
Therefore, the GATT/WTO dummies in SW’s were coded to exclude country pairs belonging to 
the same regional trade agreement or involved in GSP relationships. Similarly, the GSP dummy 
was coded to exclude country pairs belonging to a regional trade agreement (SW 2007, p. 157-
58). 
 4.2.2 Data and Results of SW (2007) 
Most of the data that SW (2007) used were from Rose (2004), including incomes, 
population, and distance, as well as geographical, cultural, and historical information. Therefore 
SW (2007) evaluated the GATT/WTO trade effects based on de jure GATT/WTO membership. 
The main difference was that they used imports rather than total trade as the dependent variable, 
which they obtained from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics and deflated imports by the US 
consumer price index (1982-1984=100) for urban areas. Moreover, they updated all the Rose 
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variables to the year 2000 and selected five-year data periods in Rose’s dataset, starting from 
1950. Thus, the SW’s dataset finally covered 172 countries during the five-year periods from 
1950 to 2000. 
Table 3 contains the core results for GATT/WTO trade effects based on SW (2007). The 
basic Rose’s (2004) finding that the GATT/WTO does not increase trade is illustrated in 
Regression I. When membership in the GATT/WTO was treated undifferentiated, SW’s result 
showed that the GATT/WTO had done even worse in promoting trade 
( 0.252 0.04 0.06( 1) ( 2)e e e      ) than in Rose (2004), since the coefficient on imports of 
GATT/WTO members was –0.252 (See column 1, Table 2; Regression I, Table 3).  While Rose 
(2004) found that GATT/WTO membership had no effect on trade, SW found that membership 
had a significantly negative effect on trade. The average GATT/WTO members traded about 
22% 0.252( 1)e   less than the average non-GATT/WTO members (Regression I, Table 3).  
However, when they distinguished between developing countries and industrial countries, 
the coefficient on industrial country members of the GATT/WTO importer dummy ( 3 ) became 
positive (1.865) and highly significant, and the coefficient on the developing country WTO 
importer dummy ( 4 ) was negative (-0.313) and significant (Regression II, Table 3). The net 
imports of GATT/WTO members were about 519% (
1.865 0.313 2e e   ) lager than that of the 
non-GATT/WTO members (Regression II). 
Regression III was a robustness check for excluding observations with values of trade 
less than $500,000. They did this for the plausible reason that small-valued observations were 
subject to more sampling and measurement errors. Accordingly, the remaining reported results 
by SW (2007) excluded observations with trade values less than $500,000, and they claimed that 
the exclusion would not alter their basic conclusions (SW 2007, p. 161). The results of 
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Regression III show that the negative coefficient on the developing country WTO importer 
dummy turned positive but not significant. 
Table 3 WTO trade effects with multilateral resistance based on SW (2007) 
 
Regression IV used Rose’s definition of GSP and GATT/WTO dummies to do a 
robustness check. The GATT/WTO trade effects decreased with the Rose definition of GSP and 
 Dependent variable: bilateral imports 
Regression #  I II III IV V 
Importer WTO member -0.252 
(0.044) 
    
Industrial country importer 
member 
 1.865 
(0.144) 
1.010 
(0.092) 
0.336 
(0.058) 
0.306 
(0.032) 
Developing country importer 
member 
 -0.313 
(0.043) 
0.017 
(0.036) 
0.017 
(0.025) 
0.137 
(0.016) 
GSP 0.234 
(0.075) 
2.149 
(0.146) 
0.806 
(0.096) 
-0.097 
(0.032) 
0.188 
(0.038) 
FTA 0.661 
(0.097) 
1.65 
(0.105) 
1.165 
(0.073) 
0.755 
(0.046) 
0.945 
(0.039) 
Time-varying importer and 
exporter fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
Country-pair random effects  No No No No Yes 
Obs. 76094 76094 55831   
2R  0.74 0.75 0.75   
Standard error of regression 1.679 1.673 1.113   
Source from: Subramanian and Wei (2007) Table 4 (1), (2), (4); Table 5 row 1, 4. 
Note: Regression I based on Rose (2004) specification; for Regression II-V, WTO dummy in I is 
disaggregated further into two dummies, and Regressions III-V exclude observations with trade 
values less than $500,000. Regression IV is Rose (2004) definition of GSP and WTO dummies. 
Intercepts and coefficients for additional regressors do not report. Robust standard errors 
(clustered by country-pairs) report below coefficient estimates. 
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GATT/WTO. However, Rose’s definition still produced a positive and statistically significant 
effect of GATT/WTO on trade volume when SW’s specification gravity model was employed. 
Regression V was another robustness check for including country-pair random effects 
with importer and exporter fixed effects; the coefficient on industrial country members of the 
GATT/WTO importer dummy became much smaller but still significant. The good news was 
that the coefficient on the developing country WTO importer dummy was now larger and 
significant, compared to Regression II and III. 
After considering the special treatment of developing countries and multilateral resistance 
terms, SW concluded that the GATT/WTO promoted international trade strongly in industrial 
countries given that imports by developed-country members of the GATT/WTO increased by 
174% (
1.01 1 1.74e   ) relative to non-WTO members, but not to developing countries 
(Regression III). This conclusion seems to be an easily acceptable accounting of Rose’s puzzling 
findings regarding GATT/WTO trade effects. However, Eicher and Henn (2011, henceforth EH) 
argued that when they extended SW’s (2007) specification gravity model to account for 
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and individual FTA trade effect, they found that the 
industrialized country’s GATT/WTO trade effects in SW’s results were actually industrialized 
FTA effects if SW’s mutually exclusive coding convention and their dataset were employed 
(Eicher and Henn 2011, p. 141). Moreover, once they used a unified specification gravity model 
to examine GATT/WTO trade effects by controlling multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral 
heterogeneity, and individual FTA trade effect together, their specification gravity model 
produced no evidence of positive GATT/WTO trade effects. Next, I will introduce this unified 
specification gravity model and EH’s results. 
34 
 
 4.3 Unified Specification Gravity Model Accounting for WTO Trade Effects 
 4.3.1 The Unified Specification Gravity Model 
EH’s (2011) specification replicated SW’s preferred specification by adding time fixed 
dummies and replacing time-invariant variables with country-pair-specific dummies. 
Furthermore, the FTA variable was defined by a set of dummies that allowed each FTA to 
account for its own individual effect on bilateral imports. The unified specification gravity model 
was of the following form: 
1 2 3
4 5 6
_ (4.3)
_
ijt mx t t mt mt xt xtt m x
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt
Logimport CPD T M X
FTA GSP WTO DVED
WTO DING CU CulCol
   
  
   
   
  
   
  
  
 ijtLogimport is log of bilateral import of importer i  from exporter j  in year t , 
 mxCPD  are a list of country-pair specific dummies (that take the value of one if 
m i and x j , and zero otherwise) to control for all time-invariant (observed and 
unobserved) bilateral heterogeneity, 
  tT  is a comprehensive set of time “fixed effects”, 
 mtM ’s are a list of time-varying importer dummies (that take the value of one if m i , and 
zero otherwise) to proxy for “multilateral resistance” of importer, 
 xtX ’s are a list of time-varying exporter dummies (that take the value of one if x j , and 
zero otherwise) to proxy for “multilateral resistance” of exporter, 
 ijtFTA is a list of dummies that takes on a value of 1 if i and j  belong to a common 
individual regional trade agreement in year t , 
 ijtGSP is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if importer i  was a GSP beneficiary of 
35 
 
exporter j or vice versa at t , 
 _ ijtWTO DVED is a dummy variable for importer i  that is a developed country WTO 
member, 
 _ ijtWTO DING is a dummy variable for importer i  that is a developing country WTO 
member, 
 ijtCU  is a binary variable which is unity if importer i  and exporter j  use the same currency 
at time t , 
 ijtCurCol  is a binary variable which is unity if importer i  is a colony of exporter j  at time i  
or vice versa, 
 ijt is a normally distributed random error term that has a zero mean and a constant variance. 
 4.3.2 Data and Results of EH (2011) 
EH’s data was based on an updated version of SW’s unbalanced panel. They adjusted the 
SW’s dataset to attribute a value of zero to GSP country-pairs that represent an industrialized 
country exporting to a developing country. The reasoning is that GSP is granted as a unilateral 
preference for industrialized countries’ imports from developing countries only. They also 
identified Luxembourg as a member of the European Union (EU) in 2000, and corrected other 
minor coding errors identified by TGR (2007). To illustrate that GATT/WTO trade effects 
vanished even when accounting for de facto membership, they used TGR’s WTO membership 
definition throughout. They also extended the SW dataset and introduced a more extensive set of 
FTAs used by Rose (2005) and Eicher et al. (2012) to properly account for the trade effects of a 
large set of individual FTAs. Subsequent sections further modified the SW’s dataset by using 
Rose’s (2004) mutually inclusive coding convention if necessary. 
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Table 4 GATT/WTO trade effects based on EH (2011) 
 
Table 4 reports the core results of EH’s (2007) examination of GATT/WTO trade effects. 
All regressions controlled the multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. 
 Dependent variable: bilateral imports 
Regression # 1 2 3 4 5 6 
WTO dummy coding SW SW SW Rose Rose Rose 
WTO Membership 
definition 
TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR TGR 
WTO_DING 0.210 
(0.147) 
-0.207 
(0.148) 
-0.254 
(0.082) 
-0.051 
(0.069) 
-0.054 
(0.069) 
-0.035 
(0.068) 
WTO_DVED 0.393 
(0.165) 
0.124 
(0.189) 
-0.068 
(0.092) 
-0.028 
(0.068) 
-0.026 
(0.068) 
-0.002 
(0.066) 
GSP -0.242 
(0.049) 
-0.233 
(0.049) 
-0.181 
(0.047) 
-0.252 
(0.048) 
-0.228 
(0.049) 
-0.187 
(0.048) 
FTA    0.473 
(0.045) 
  
FTA_DVED 0.361 
(0.055) 
     
FTA_DING 0.545 
(0.082) 
     
Importer and exporter  
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj 2R  0.8747 0.8751 0.8760 0.8747 0.8751 0.8760 
Source from: Eicher and Henn (2011) Table 1a column 4-6; Table 2 column 4-6 
Note: Individual FTA coefficients of Regression # 2-3 and # 4-6 do not report. Additional 
regressors in (4.2) also do not report. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) are in 
parentheses. 
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Regression 2-3 and 5-6 also contained individual regional trade agreement effects. Regression 1 
reexamined SW’s results by controlling unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and obtained a much 
smaller coefficient (0.393) of industrial country importer GATT/WTO members than that of SW 
(2007) (See Regression III, Table 3; Regression 1, Table 4). Regression 2 added individual 
regional trade agreements that were included in Rose’s dataset except US-Israel FTA, and 
PATCRA. Regression 3 updated some new FTAs omitted from Rose’s dataset, such as EFTA, 
EEA, AP, LAIA, and APEC. The result was a dramatic decrease of GATT/WTO induced trade 
effects, even for industrialized countries. 
When they used Rose’s GATT/WTO dummy coding invention, all GATT/WTO trade 
effects had become negative but were very close to zero (Regression 4-6 in Table 4). Since 
Rose’s (2005) results showed that GATT/WTO membership had a small but significant positive 
effect on trade flows without considering multilateral resistance terms, it seemed that controlling 
multilateral resistance would negate GATT/WTO trade effects. Thus, EH (2011) drew the same 
conclusion as Rose that there was no empirical evidence to prove that GATT/WTO membership 
had a positive effect on trade flow, even when we controlled the multilateral resistance, 
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual FTA trade effect. 
These economists’ empirical work to understand the GATT/WTO trade effects mystery 
shows that, even though TGR (2007) and SW (2007) cast light on some possible explanations, 
the mystery remains. We certainly do not dismiss their work; it encourages further research and 
offers useful guidance to future attempts at deciphering the effects of trade agreements or 
international trade institutions on trade. For example, Chang and Lee (2011) proposed a 
nonparametric method to re-evaluate the GATT/WTO trade effects and obtained large 
GATT/WTO trade-promoting effects. Their estimates suggest that membership in the 
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GATT/WTO by both countries on average raises bilateral trade volume by 74% ( 0.553 1e  ) to 
277% ( 1.328 1e  ) for country-pairs that both chose to be in the GATT/WTO (Chang and Lee 
2011, Table 4).Since their methods are outside the scope of our inquiry, we will not introduce it, 
but they offered a new scope of methodology that can be employed to solve Rose’s mysterious 
findings.   
 
Chapter 5 - Remarks and Conclusion 
An in-depth consideration of Rose’s (2004) and other economists’ empirical work on 
measuring the GATT/WTO trade effects on international trade illuminate their remarkably 
diverse results. We attribute the divergent conclusions to the following: The first divergence 
concerns the use of de jure versus de facto definitions of membership. When TGR (2007) used 
de facto membership to measure GATT/WTO trade effects, their results were extraordinarily 
positive. The second divergence resulted when holding that the gravity model omitted 
multilateral resistance; however, the consensus is that this would be more likely to have a 
negative effect on international trade.  
The third divergence came when treating developing countries differently. Differential 
treatment effects could partially explain Rose’s findings, but one might argue that if the 
GATT/WTO had uneven trade effects on its members, then the validity of GATT/WTO trade 
effects might be unpersuasive. The fourth divergence occurred when taking unobserved bilateral 
heterogeneity into consideration. Even though Rose (2004) used substantial time-invariant 
variables to capture bilateral heterogeneity, it was not enough because it was difficult to include 
every potential source of bilateral heterogeneity; thus, using country-pair fixed effects might be a 
preferred replacement. Taking individual regional trade agreement effects into consideration 
39 
 
produced yet another divergence. As Chapter 2 explains, the regionalism movement may cause 
challenges to the multilateral GATT/WTO. According to EH’s (2011) empirical work, regional 
trade agreements seemed to be more effective in promoting trade flow than did the GATT/WTO. 
In this report, we briefly describe the history and design of GATT/WTO and we also 
have clarified that the GATT/WTO, which serves as a relatively effective multilateral trade 
agreement, indeed reduces trade barriers among GATT/WTO members, and thus promotes 
international trade flows. We argue that Rose’s mysterious findings that run counter to our 
findings can be explained by the fact that his specification gravity model omitted multilateral 
resistance terms and failed to capture unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. However, we find that 
even if economists use an accurate specification gravity model by controlling multilateral 
resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual regional trade agreement effect to 
evaluate the GATT/WTO trade effects, one still cannot fully account for Rose’s mysterious and 
counter-intuitive findings on GATT/WTO trade effects. 
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